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Abstract 
This paper investigates the gender-selection decisions of immigrants in the United Kingdom, 
using data from the 1971-2006 General Household Survey. We examine sex-selection in the UK 
among immigrant families and the gender composition of previous births, conditional on socio-
economic characteristics. Our key result is that better-educated immigrants balance their family 
after the birth of two sons, by having a daughter thereafter. Our study also is the first to estimate 
the number of missing women among Asian immigrants in a European country, contributing to 
research on the US and Canada that missing women are also a phenomenon of the developed 
world.  
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1. Introduction 
Emerging economies depict striking demographic patterns: during the past four decades, the sex 
ratio at birth (SRB), measured as the annual number of male births per 1000 female births, has 
followed an increasing trend, predominantly in China and India. ‘Missing women’ were 
investigated first by Visaria (1967) and Sen (1992), to designate the conspicuous gender 
imbalances in the sex ratio at birth in India, attributed mainly to the long-standing cultural value 
and economic necessity of sons. Currently, estimates show that as many as 89 million women are 
demographically missing in various Asia-Pacific countries, with China and India jointly 
accounting for 84 million (UNDP 2010). Moreover, in the developed world which is absolutely 
more prosperous than the developing world, it is interesting to examine if missing women also 
exist here (Dubuc and Coleman 2007; Abrevaya 2009; Almond et al 2009). 
A concern is that parents preferring sons to daughters may resort to prenatal sex-selection 
techniques to establish the birth of a son (Hu and Scholsser 2012). One important study in the 
field shows that sex-selection incentives become more pertinent as a household approaches its 
own predetermined family size limit, as the opportunity cost of having a child of the less 
preferred gender increases (Abrevaya 2009). Therefore the predictions are that son-biased gender 
selection tendencies most likely manifest themselves through abnormally high male-birth 
likelihoods at later birth parities, when family size limitations start to bite, as well as at births 
following daughters.  
This paper extends the scarce literature on missing women in the developed world by 
investigating whether these two irregularities in male births are present among Indian and 
Pakistani immigrants in the UK. We also present the determinants of a household’s sex-selection 
choice. To the best of our knowledge, there has been one important study which examines 
missing women in the UK (Dubuc and Coleman 2007). However, by employing national birth 
data, this study does not analyze the underlying causes of sex-selection at the household level by 
observing the gender composition of previous births.  
Our study addresses this gap by examining the implied incidence of sex-selection amongst 
Indian and Pakistani immigrants in the UK, based on data from the General Household Survey 
1971-2006. We find higher male-birth likelihoods for Indian families, relative to English 
families, both at later birth parities and when following the birth of daughters.  Moreover, the 
results suggest that higher levels of education increase the propensity to sex-select. We also 
provide evidence that a larger family size among Pakistani families potentially mitigates their 
tendency to sex-select as early as the third parity. One of our main findings for better educated 
Indian families both in the UK and India is a desire to balance the family after the birth of two 
sons by having a daughter thereafter. Additionally, this study disentangles the ‘explained’ and 
‘unexplained’ components that constitute the average differences in male-birth likelihoods 
between Indian immigrants and English natives, using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method, and finds that 87% of that difference can be attributed to the effect of ethnicity. Lastly, 
3 
 
our study quantifies the number of missing women among Indian immigrants in 1993-2006 and 
calculates this value as 914.  
 
2. Sex ratios at birth and missing women 
The existing literature on missing women is diverse and is mainly focused on developing 
countries (Anderson and Ray 2010). In this section, we outline why the issue of missing women 
has captured the attention of economists, and in particular why the issue may be of relevance in 
developed countries as well, even though the scale on which we observe this in the developed 
world is still small, relative to countries such as India and China.  
Demographically, as many as 200 million women and girls around the world are missing 
according to the United Nations. Put simply, ‘missing women’ are those whom ceteris paribus 
should be alive, but are not. Boys are naturally more likely to die in infancy than girls and more 
boys are born than girls. In all societies that record births, 103-105 boys are normally born for 
every 100 girls (see Austin and Edwards 1981; Johansson and Nygren 1991; Gini 1955; James 
2000; Pollard 1969). The biological SRB had long been stable at roughly 1.05 in all societies that 
record births (Austin and Edwards 1981). This has changed in the past 25 years when ultrasound 
technology (and to a lesser extent amniocentesis technology) became available and affordable to 
women. The use of ultrasound techniques for sex determination and sex-selective abortion has 
been reported since the early 1980s in South Korea and China (Park and Cho 1995; Zeng et al. 
1993) and since the late 1980s in India (Bhat and Zavier 2003; Das Gupta and Bhat 1997), 
especially at higher birth orders.  According to UN estimates, the sex ratio at birth has increased 
globally from a stable 1.05 in the early 1970s to a recent peak of 1 (Ganatra 2008 and Sen 2003). 
In China, despite the country’s official ban on prenatal sex determinations since 1989 and on 
sex-selective abortion since 1994, the sex ratio for the generation born between 2000 and 2004 
was more than 1.20 (Shuzhuo 2007). According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the 
ratio today has reached 123 boys per 100 girls. In India, according to the 2001 Census, the ratio 
of boys to girls in the 0-6 age group was 1.08, up from 105.8 in 1991. In 1998 the sex ratio in 
Pakistan reached 108.5 in the country as a whole and 112.2 in urban areas, reflecting a 2.7% 
increase from 1981.  
There is a small body of literature on the existence of ‘missing women’ in developed countries. 
The nationally observed SRB in modern economies does not suggest sex-selection. There 
appears to be a general consensus that, on average, parents in developed countries do not exhibit 
a preference for children of particular sex by this measure. For example, the evidence offered in 
Angrist and Evans (1998) for the United States and McDougall et al. (1999) for Canada reveals 
that parents in these counties have a preference for having a child of each sex. That said, son 
preference has been found in some immigrant and ethnic populations in these countries. 
Examining the sex ratio of births at different parities among mothers who have yet to give birth 
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to a son, Abrevaya (2009) and Almond et al. (2010) report evidence of son preference within the 
East and South Asian communities of the U.S and Canada respectively. The likelihood of a male 
birth has remained at just above 51% in the US (Abrevaya 2009). However, when disaggregating 
1971-2004 California birth data by race, Abrevaya (2009) finds that for Indian families, a third-
born child is approximately 7% more likely to be male than the first-born child, conditional on 
all previous births being female. Similarly, for Canada, Almond et al. (2009) uncover missing 
women among first generation South East Asian-born immigrants, by analyzing 2001 and 2006 
Canadian Census data. One very recent study of immigrant groups in Canada shows that 
multiparous women born in India were significantly more likely to have a male infant than their 
counterparts born in Canada (Ray, Henry and Urquia 2012). Related work has also documented 
in Canada and the US, gender differences in the care of young children and early child inputs 
that are important for child development (Baker and Milligan 2011). 
To the best of our knowledge, only one study, that by Dubuc and Coleman (2007), focuses on the 
existence of missing women amongst immigrant populations in the UK. This study documents 
the overall upward trend in the SRB to India-born mothers living in the UK since the 1980s. 
Using time-series analysis, they find a sharp rise in the SRB, from 1.04 during 1969-1989 to 1.14 
for third and later births after 1990. These figures closely mimic the experience of India. 
According to India’s 2006 National Family Health Survey-1, the average SRB obtained for the 
overlapping period of 1978-1992 stands at 1.06, while in 2000, at 1.12. This escalating trend in 
the SRB coincides with the public availability and affordability of contemporary prenatal gender-
selection technologies (Scholly et al. 1980;  Dubuc and Coleman 2007).  
 
2.1. Economic and cultural motives underlying male-biased sex-selection 
Institutional and socio-economic factors may prompt parents to select sons. Current research 
emphasizes the failure of capital markets: the inability to save, to take on insurance and the lack 
of a coherent national pension system in most Asian countries which implies that the poor rely 
heavily on children for support in old age, especially sons (Chung and Das Gupta 2007).  
Patrilineality may be another factor: core productive assets, such as land, are traditionally passed 
on through the male line, while women may be given movable goods in the form of a dowry, 
placing families with daughters at an economic disadvantage. This makes women dependent on 
their sons as a form of informal familial insurance (Das Gupta et al 2003). Yet, what is curious 
both in India and in China is that it is the affluent rather than poorest states that may discriminate 
most against girls, casting doubt on whether male-biased sex-selection is a consequence of 
economic necessity alone (Almond et al 2009). 
There is some research which examines the cultural value accorded to sons in some Asian 
societies. For example, Mencius, a Chinese philosopher wrote that “A woman is to be 
subordinate to her father in youth, her husband in maturity and her son in old age”. In Hinduism 
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only a son can light a parent’s funeral pyre (see Iyer 2002, pp. 40-42 for a more full discussion). 
Qian (2008) reveals the apparent inability of women in China to influence the household’s sex-
selection decision. Moreover, the persistence of fertility-related cultural norms within particular 
communities might cause both high fertility and gender selection. If the economic motive is the 
principal factor explaining gender-selection in the home country, then this practice should be 
significantly limited in the UK.  If, however, cultural norms do indeed persist, it is not clear 
whether economic development would suppress this tendency.  
 
2.2 Family size and gender composition of previous births  
Abreyava (2009) emphasizes that the incentives for gender selection depend not only on gender 
preferences but also on preferences for family size. Gender-selection incentives become stronger 
as a family approaches its own size limit. For instance, if a family has strong son-preference and 
wants only two children, then the data should show a higher percentage of boys among second 
births as families use stopping rules and possibly gender selection. More generally, the 
incentives for gender selection increase as the desired family size is reached (Retherford and Roy 
2003) and the opportunity cost of having a child of the less-preferred gender increases. This 
suggests that son-biased gender selection will most likely manifest itself in unusually high male 
birth rates at later births and unusually high male-birth rates following daughters.    
The sex-composition of previous children and the family’s predetermined optimal size jointly 
determine its subsequent fertility behavior. This is known in the literature as the family’s 
‘fertility stopping rule’ (Ebenstein 2007; Larsen et al 2008). Jha et al. (2006) reveal that in India, 
unnaturally high SRB occur for children born at higher birth parities, solely when the gender of 
all previous births is female. Further, recent studies show fewer missing women among Muslim 
households than among Hindu ones (Iyer et al 2009; Almond et al 2009).  
We anticipate, therefore, that families with strict stopping rules - son preference compounded by 
a small desired family size - may resort to sex-selection earlier in the birth order, conditional on 
previous births being female (Retherford and Roy 2003). In this study we investigate whether the 
irregularities of high male birth rates at higher birth parities, and high male birth rates following 
daughters are present among different groups in the United Kingdom as well as whether skewed 
sex ratios present in a particular ethnic group are associated with their desire for smaller families. 
The use of higher parity and male birth percentages conditional upon previous gender has been 
considered in several previous studies of Asian countries (see, for example, Das Gupta and Bhat 
1997, Gu and Roy 1995, Park and Cho 1995, Retherford and Roy 2003, Jha et al. 2006, and 
Ebenstein 2007) but has not been used before for the United Kingdom. 
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3. Data 
We employ data from the General Household Survey (GHS), a nationally representative survey 
of individuals living in private households in the United Kingdom. It includes family and 
individual-level information such as wealth, economic status, educational attainment, country of 
birth, area of residence and family structure. We construct an independent cross-sectional 
dataset, for the years 1971-2006
2
, as the number of observations for immigrant families in each 
year is too small to yield precise estimates.   
In the data, the year and month of birth is reported for each family member. Using this 
information, we code variables for the sex and birth parity of all children born. These are then 
linked to their parents, for whom we know the country of birth. These data provide us with both 
dependent and independent variables for the analysis. The full dataset consists of 1,091,629 
observations at the individual level but we convert these to the household level, using household 
identifiers unique to each individual. When we include only English, Indian and Pakistani 
households, this comprises a total of 251,667 households in the dataset. Among them, 102430 
households have at least one child.  
We define family size as completed fertility. We use this to proxy desired family size which is 
asked in demographic surveys to ascertain the number of children that people want rather than 
the number they actually have. Our survey includes questions on cohabitation prior to marriage, 
previous marriages and all live births, and was addressed to all women aged 16 to 49, except 
non-married women aged 16 and 17. Our key variable of interest is the sex at first birth, second 
birth, third birth and so forth and refers to all live births. If there are step-children living in the 
household, then this is not reflected in the birth variable. Adopted and stepchildren are included 
in the same family unit as their adoptive/stepparents. Foster-children, however, are not part of 
their foster-parents’ family (since they are not related to their foster-parents) and are counted as 
separate non-family units. If the child is not living in the household currently or is deceased, it 
would still be included in the ‘all live birth data’ variable. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the data. The first three columns present information on 
the gender of the first three children of the household, by parents’ ethnicity. For example, among 
the 99691 first children whose parents are both English, we observe 51586 males and 48105 
females. The last two columns present the gender of the third child given the sex-composition of 
the previous two children. Although the parents’ ethnicity and the gender of previous children 
capture some heterogeneity among households, they do not allow for further heterogeneity 
among the subgroups.  
 
                                                          
  
2
 The data excludes 1997-1998 and 1999-2000, as we do not have enough information about immigrants for these 
years. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
A first look at the dataset shows that parents’ education and the family’s predetermined optimal 
size seem to be determinants for the gender of the child: for example, 48.8% of Indian 
households with two daughters gave birth to their first son. However, this percentage increases to 
60.9% for the best educated Indian households. Determinants such as education are included in 
the estimation procedure which we present in the next section. For that section, the ethnicity 
categories are reduced to three due to the low number of mixed-household observations. In Table 
2, we present the distribution of children by ethnicity. There are 89.5% of English households 
which have three children or less, whereas these percentages for Indian and Pakistani households 
are 78% and 50.3% respectively.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
In this paper we compare our findings to those from a different dataset taken from the National 
Family Health Survey of India (NFHS), a nationally representative survey of people living in 
private households in India from 2005-2006. We excluded twins, triplets and quadruplets from 
the dataset. The distributions of children of Indian residents in India and Indian residents in the 
UK do have important differences; for example Indian residents in India typically have larger 
families.  If this is the case, it is possible that Indian immigrants in the UK may have a stronger 
preference for gender selection compared to Indian residents at a given parity. This can happen if 
and only if their preferences do not change due to relocation. However, it is possible that their 
preferences may change due to cultural contagion experienced in the host country. 
In the analysis of our data from both the UK and Indian datasets, we use the following variables, 
whose definitions are listed in Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 The Determinants of Male-Biased Sex Selection 
The focus of our study is on the determinants of male-biased sex selection. Since sex selective 
abortion is a latent variable, similar to other studies in this field, we proxy this with the 
likelihood of male births (Jha et al 2006).  The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
capturing the likelihood of a male birth; hence a Logit or Probit model of discrete choice is 
appropriate. Under the logistic distribution, the general form of the function linking child gender 
with a set of the determinants of sex selection is: 
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Where Y is a child gender dummy variable and x is a vector of the determinants of male-biased 
sex selection. ζ is the set of parameters that need to be estimated and Λ(.) indicates the logistic 
cumulative distribution function. Such non-linear binary choice models are estimated based on 
the method of Maximum Likelihood and have several advantages over linear probability models 
(LPM), such as overcoming the 0-1 interval restriction imposed on fitted probabilities by the 
LPM, and constant marginal effects.  It is acknowledged that the LPM can be an alternative 
model since the fitted probabilities are very close to 50 percent. However, it yields nearly 
identical results, so we choose to use the logit model. Abreyava (2009) found nearly identical 
results by using LPM and probit estimation. For this comparison, he assumed that the gender of a 
child conditional on the previous sex composition is estimated using a probit model. Similarly, 
we assume that the gender of a child conditional on the previous sex composition is modelled 
estimated using a logit model. Finally, our prediction procedure gives almost identical results 
with logit and the LPM.
3
  
The descriptive statistics shown in Section 3 provide evidence that the interactions of socio-
economic variables with gender composition of previous births should also be included, thus the 
term     in equation (1) can be written as follows: 
                       ∑  
 
     ∑ ∑                       
 
   
 
    
 
   ∑     
 
                               (2)                                   
    is a set of J-1 socio-economic covariates plus a constant vector which takes the value one for 
all observations which determine the likelihood of a male birth at a given parity, for household   . 
The J-1 variables capture the heterogeneity among individuals and households and their 
definition is given in Table 4.    is a set of J coefficients which need to be estimated. 
                 is a set of K gender composition of previous births dummy variables. The 
omitted case is all previous children are male. In the case of the second child, this is a single 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the first child is female. In the case of the third child, 
this term is a set of two dummy variables: all previous children are female; and previous children 
are one male and one female. In this case 2J γ coefficients need to be estimated.    is a set of T 
time dummy variables included to adjust for the fact that the population may have different 
distributions in different time periods and    is a set of T coefficients. Equation 1 (and 2) should 
be estimated for each ethnic group. Thus we reduce the ethnic groups to three and we present 
3KJ+T coefficients. 
In keeping with our discussion above, we estimate a logit model based on equation 2 for each 
ethnic group, but with the cost of a lack of a formal test of whether the coefficients differ among 
the groups. A frequent strategy in overcoming this issue is to use the full sample and interact all 
                                                          
3
 For example, the number 387 in Table 5 becomes 388 when using the LPM results. 
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the equation variables with the ethnic dummy variables. Thus we can test for the difference 
between two coefficients across ethnic groups. Applying this strategy, equation 2 becomes: 
      ∑ ∑  
  
        
 
   
 
    ∑ ∑ ∑                             
 
   
 
   
 
     ∑     
 
         (3)                            
Where       is a set of three variables: a constant vector which takes the value one for all 
observations and the Pakistani and Indian dummy variables as defined in Table 2. The omitted 
variable is the English dummy variable and we can test if the differences in coefficients are 
statistically significant or not. 
Given our previous discussion of the link between religion and optimal family size, we argue that 
sex selection may be greater among Indian rather than among Pakistani immigrants, as the 
proportions of Hindus relative to Muslims are 45% compared to 13% for Indian immigrants, 
while they are 1% of Hindus compared to 92% of Muslims for Pakistani immigrants (UK Census 
2001). We expect this because some kinds of abortion are religiously prohibited in Islam, so 
Muslims might not use this as much (see Iyer 2002 for a detailed discussion). Second, Muslim 
families may be more tolerant of having daughters and larger families than their Hindu 
counterparts due to their lower practice of giving dowries at the time of marriage (Borooah et al 
2009). As most of the Pakistanis are Muslims (92%) and most of the Indians are Hindu (45%), 
we expect a positive coefficient for the IndianXAllgirls variable. We thus expect a positive and 
significant relationship between IndianXAllgirls and   (   
 
  ) at the third or even second 
parity, depending on the strictness of their stopping rules: an Indian household, endowed with 
son preference and having only female children, may possibly ensure that the birth of their next 
child is male through sex-selective abortion.  Due to their presumably larger desired family size, 
the coefficient on PakistaniXAllgirls should not be suggestive of sex-selective abortion at such 
parities. Moreover, we expect that neither IndianXGendermix nor PakistaniXGendermix will be 
positively related to the probability of a male birth, as both ethnicities are less likely to resort to 
sex-selective abortion at any parity, if they already have at least one child of the preferred 
gender.  
We control for the average household education level and employment status, as highly educated 
and employed families tend to have fewer children. Further, highly educated households are 
typically better able to access and implement these new technologies (Chung and Dasgupta 
2007).We thus anticipate high sex ratios for such son-preferring families. We further control for 
income effects such as wealth, measured by whether the household owns a house. Following 
Clark (2003), we further propose that home ownership for an immigrant household perhaps 
represents a step towards cultural assimilation within the British community, and which might 
possibly also lead to the erosion of certain practices from the home country including son 
preference.  
As discussed above, a larger family size is likely to provide the desired number of sons, 
alleviating the need to resort to sex-selection as early as the third parity. Sex-selection among 
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Pakistani immigrant families is therefore more likely to show up at higher than third order births. 
Hence we expect a statistically insignificant coefficient on PakistaniXAllgirls. If this is indeed 
the case, there is a way to test if Pakistani families have a larger desired family size than Indian 
families, when both are compared to the English base group. 
Following the methodology of Borooah and Iyer (2004), we can examine the relationship 
between family size and ethnicity, using a Negative Binominal Regression Model and a Poisson 
Regression model. We can test if Pakistani families have a larger desired family size than Indian 
families, when both are compared to the English base group. Allowing for different coefficients 
for various ethnic groups, we estimate the following simple Poisson Regression Model: 
 (   )  
       
  
             (∑ ∑            
 
   
 
     ∑     
 
   )                       ( )                               
 
4.2 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: The decomposition of inter-ethnic differences 
in the likelihood of a male birth 
The original Oaxaca-Blinder method of linearly decomposing inter-group differences in means 
into an ‘explained’ and ‘residual’ component has been extended to decomposing inter-group 
differences in probabilities, derived from models of  discrete choice (Nielsen 1998). We use this 
method to disentangle the ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ components accounting for the 
difference in the average probability of a male birth at a given parity between ethnic groups.  
Defining the likelihood at a given parity of a male birth under a Logit model as in equations 1 
and 2, the average probability of a male birth for ethnicity r is: 
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   ̅(  
    )    
  ∑ (  
    )
  
   
 
where   
 
 is a vector of all variables in equation 2 and    its associated vector of coefficients. 
   is the number of households per ethnic group r.  
Taking the difference in the average probabilities of a male birth between group 1 and group 2, 
we define: 
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  [ ̅(  
    )   ̅(  
    )]  [ ̅(  
    )   ̅(  
    )]                            (5) 
The first term in square brackets, in equation 5, represents the ‘Ethnic’ effect: it is the difference 
in the average probabilities of a male birth between the two groups resulting from inter-ethnic 
differences in unobserved endowments (as exemplified by differences in the coefficient vectors) 
conditional on all observable covariates. The second term in square brackets represents the 
‘Attributes’ effect: it is the difference in average outcomes between two groups resulting from 
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inter-group differences in attributes, when these attributes are evaluated using a common 
coefficient vector. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results allow us to distinguish the weight 
of the ‘Ethnic’ and ‘Attributes’ effects in explaining outcome differences between the two 
groups.  
4.3 Estimating the number of missing women in the United Kingdom 
One contribution of our study is to estimate the number of missing women among a sample of 
immigrants in the UK, employing a methodology not previously used in the literature, which 
follows nicely from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  First, we estimate equation 2 for 
English families, using a logit model with robust standard errors and generate the probability of a 
male birth at a given parity for each English household. Summing these probabilities over all 
English households gives us the actual number of male births at a given parity for English 
natives. We perform the same exercise for the sample of ethnic immigrants. However, if we 
estimate equation 2 for an ethnic group of immigrants using a logit model and we apply these 
estimates in the same equation but use the English covariates instead, this will generate the 
probability of a male birth at a given parity, if an English household behaved as if it were an 
immigrant household: 
    (     
    )  
   (  
        )
      (  
        )
                                                   ( )  
where    corresponds to English covariates and Immigrant coefficients. By summing the 
probabilities over all English households, we can find the predicted number of male births for a 
given parity among English families if they behaved as immigrants. The predicted percentage 
change in the number of male births for English families is:  
∑ {    (     
    )}  ∑ {     (     
     )}
    
   
    
   
∑ {     (     
     )}
    
   
                               
By a similar methodology, one can estimate the relevant prediction for immigrant families, had 
they behaved as the native English. It is worth noting that the main difference between this 
approach and the Oaxaca decomposition is that we assume that only the preferences (captured by 
the coefficients) will change for one of the two groups suggesting that the household attributes 
will remain the same as before. Hence we are careful to use the phrase “behaved as immigrants” 
rather than “had been immigrants” to describe their behavior.   
5. Results 
In Tables 4a, 4b and 4c we present our econometric results based on equations 1 and 3 (or 1 and 
2) for the Logit model and equation 4 for the Poisson Regression Model. For all the models, we 
report marginal effects and standard errors associated with the marginal effects.  We control for 
regional and time effects but for brevity do not report them.  
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The standard errors are clustered at the level of ethnicity and geographic area. Clustering at the 
level of ethnicity allows for the possibility that the behavior of households originating from the 
same home country may be correlated due to ethnic-specific norms (Clark 2003). However, as 
cluster robust standard errors require the number of groups to go to infinity in order to be 
consistent, we choose to cluster on the interactions of the ethnicity groups reported in Table 1 
and geographic area. This strategy allows for the English (or any other ethnic group) that live in 
London to behave differently compared to the English (or any other ethnic group) that live in 
other regions. Additionally, this increases our group numbers to 31 rather than 3.  
For columns one and two, we estimate the Logit model based on equation 1 and 3 using the 
General Household Survey dataset. In column one, the model is estimated with the dependent 
variable being the third-child-male indicator variable for families with at least three children, 
whereas, in column two we use the male indicator variable at the second parity for families with 
at least two children. In column three, we estimate the Poisson Regression Model using the same 
dataset. 
In column four, we estimate equations 1 and 2 using the information obtained from the NFHS 
dataset. Hence we examine the preferences of Indian households that live in India. The 
dependent variable for this case is the third-child-male indicator for families with at least three 
children. It is important to note that the coefficients represent directly the preferences and not the 
differences from other ethnic groups. So the first three columns in each table are the results for 
the UK; the last column is for India. 
As English is the omitted category, the coefficients in Table 4a should be interpreted as: The 
probability of a male birth at a given parity for an English household, conditional on all previous 
births being male, mixed-gender or female. The coefficients in Tables 4b (and 4c) should be 
interpreted as: The difference in the probability of a male birth at a given parity between an 
Indian (or Pakistani) and an English household, conditional on all previous births. Similarly, the 
omitted variable in all three tables is all previous births being male. Consequently, the allgirls (or 
mixed gender) interactions should be interpreted as: The difference in the probability of a male-
birth at a given parity between households with all previous children being female (or a mixed 
set of males and females) and household with all previous children being male, depending on 
ethnicity. 
Looking at the results of column 3, employed, wealthy and more educated English households 
prefer smaller families.  Pakistani families have on average more children than English families. 
Uneducated and wealthier Pakistani households tend to have even more children. These results 
and the descriptive statistics we present in Table 2 provide evidence that the practice of sex-
selective abortion among Pakistani immigrants may be prevalent among higher order births but 
unlikely to show up at second and third births as their ‘male-preferring stopping rule’ implies 
relatively low restrictions on family size. On the other hand, Indian households deviate from 
English households as follows: Uneducated households prefer larger families, whereas the best 
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educated households prefer smaller families. Owning a house boosts the preferences for larger 
families. These results provide evidence that the practice of sex-selection among uneducated and 
wealthy Indian immigrants may be prevalent at the fourth parity. However, as we want to 
examine the differences in coefficients between ethnic groups, we give emphasis to the second 
and third parity since 89.5% of English household have three or less children. Regarding the 
choice of the PRM, the likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
overdispersion, suggesting that the PRM is an improvement to the NBRM. 
Comparing column 1 and column 2, we observe higher coefficients in absolute values for the 
first column which supports the hypothesis that households are engaging in sex-selection when 
they have their last child. Thus, it is reasonable to focus on the column 1 results for all English 
households and non-uneducated Indian households. The results in column 1 possibly provide 
evidence that Indian families are engaging more in sex-selection compared to English families. 
On average, uneducated English families seem to engage in sex-selection of male births in case 
they have two male children. Again, only uneducated English households engage in sex-selection 
of female births when they have two girls or a mixed group of boys and girls. However, these 
coefficients are relatively small. 
Since we reduce our ethnic groups, it is possible that the English sex-selection arises from the 
fact that we define “English” as a family where at least one parent was born in the UK. To test 
that, we apply the model presented in column 1 on the “pure” English families only, and we find 
that for the uneducated English households the coefficient of the interaction of the university 
dummy with the dummy of households with two female children is 0.088 (near 0.083) even with 
the reduced sample. The standard error is 0.039 and it is again statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  In contrast, the best-educated Indian households with two boys seem to undertake sex-
selection compared to English households possibly in order to give birth to a daughter. Both 
uneducated English and best-educated Indian households seem to prefer a balanced household. 
This is consistent with the results in column 4 for Indians in the home country. For Indian 
families with two girls, all prefer a third male child. The best educated households have much 
higher incentives to indulge in sex-selection. These results are in line with the results in column 
4 for the best educated households, but this is not evident for the remainder of households. It is 
possible that living in a developed country with publicly-provided health-care provides all 
residents with enough information about sex-determination techniques so that even the less 
educated families have this information.   
INSERT TABLE 4a, 4b and 4c HERE 
Finally, although the best educated Indian families with a mixed-gender set of previous children 
in the home country use the techniques we describe above to have a second boy, this does not 
occur in the host country possibly because of varied cultural effects. Overall, the effect of 
education on the incentives for sex-selection among son-preferring families is clearly positive, 
endorsing our initial conjecture and the findings by Jha et al. (2006) that educated households are 
14 
 
generally more aware of the availability of gender determination techniques and so more likely 
to use them.
4
 Lastly, for the Pakistani coefficients reported in Table 4c, we need to mention that 
they might not be in line with the results in Table 1, but this occurs because we do not present 
the regional dummy coefficients; for example, the interaction of IndianXtwogirlXLondon is 0.37, 
statistically significant, and over 60% of Indian households with the first two being female 
children live in London. 
Regarding the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using equation 5, the difference in average male 
birth probabilities between the English (group 1) and the Indians (group 2) in the UK is -0.0166. 
The ethnic effect is found to be 86.95%. Intuitively, this represents the proportion of the average 
difference in male birth likelihoods which are explained by giving Indians an English ethnicity, 
conditional on both groups having the same attributes. The balance percentage is the attribute 
effect which represents the proportion of the relevant difference that is explained by giving 
Indians English attributes, conditional on both groups having the same ethnicity. 
By using equation 6, we estimate the number of ‘missing women’ in the UK among Indian 
immigrants. The estimation is carried out for two time periods: 1970-2006 and 1993-2006. For 
our main results provided in Table 4 column 1, we assume that the coefficients are the same for 
all time periods. However, this is not true as we know that sex-determination was not possible 
before the 25
th
 week of pregnancy until the late 1980s (Dubuc and Coleman 2007). Also in the 
period 1980-1992 consumers were uncertain about the quality of the “new product” and the 
prices of sex-determination procedures were significantly higher. In the last period consumers 
overcame their hesitation regarding the safety of the procedure and prices fell significantly. 
Consequently, the latter period 1993-2006 captures the peak of the use of the technology for sex-
selective abortion.  
We construct Table 5 where Panel (A) contrasts the numbers of boys and girls that Indian 
families actually gave birth to (Actual), with the corresponding number in the case where they 
are endowed with English characteristics (Predicted), noting how many Indian households would 
have essentially changed their fertility decision from boys to girls, holding the number of 
children constant. Equivalently, Panel (B) depicts the relevant figures for English families. 
Panel (A) suggests that, for the whole period, there would have been 3.00% fewer boys among 
Indian families, had they been given English preferences or equivalently 3.37% more girls. In the 
subset, these percentages are slightly higher, consonant with enhanced sex-selective abortion 
availability after 1990. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
                                                          
4
 Recall that we ignore the results of never-schooled households since column 4 provides evidence that fully 
uneducated Indian households have significantly larger families. 
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From Panel (B), we can infer that, had English families had the Indian son-preferring 
characteristics, they would have had 5.39% less boys in the whole sample but a striking 11.42% 
additional boys during the final period (or equivalently 751 missing women). The results for the 
full sample come from the fact that the Indian coefficients were estimated for earlier periods, and 
because 9170 English households have two boys. This is about 15.6% more households 
compared to English households with two girls, as shown in Table 1.  
By accepting the evidence of Dubuc and Coleman (2007) regarding the national number of 
Indian third-parity male births (about 8000 for our critical period), we conclude that there are  
914 missing women for that period
5
. Abrevaya (2009) finds “a conservative estimate” of 1,300 
missing women among Indian families in the USA during a similar period 1992–2004. Our 
results seem consistent with the Abrevaya study if we take into account the difference between 
immigrant population sizes: there are approximately 1.5 times as many Indian Americans as 
there are British Indians (US Census and UK Census). Abrevaya’s corresponding number for our 
case is 867, which belongs to the closed interval of [751,914]. Finally, if we take into account the 
95% confidence intervals provided in Table 5 above, we estimate 914 missing women with a 
95% confidence interval of [230,1597]. 
Two important caveats that affect the validity of our findings need to be acknowledged. Firstly, 
despite the efforts made to expand our sample size by pooling over all survey years, any causal 
and quantitative claims that concern the determinants of sex-selection decisions deduced from 
the marginal effects of three-variable interaction terms, must be advanced very cautiously, as the 
sample size becomes rather small. Indeed, the best we can do is to provide qualitative 
conclusions about these effects. Secondly, even though we include all controls available in the 
dataset and account for time, region and ethnic fixed effects, it is still not possible to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across households, individuals and time.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, data from the General Household Survey 1971-2006 are used to explore a gap in 
the literature: the relationship between sex-selection in the UK among immigrant families and 
the gender composition of previous births, conditional on various socio-economic characteristics.  
This study briefly outlines the literature on missing women in the context of fully effective 
gender-determination technologies and son-preferring cultural attitudes. We contribute to this 
literature with new evidence of elevated male-birth likelihoods both at later births and 
conditional on female-dominated previous births, amongst Indian immigrant families. We also 
                                                          
5
 We note that in our UK dataset, the national number of Indian third-party make births is 6579, and so we estimate 
that the number of missing women in our specific dataset is 751. However, we report above our missing women 
estimates relative to the Dubuc and Coleman number for ease of comparison between the two studies. 
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provide evidence to suggest that the larger desired family size among Pakistani families possibly 
mitigates their tendency to sex-select at relatively early parities. We also show that higher 
education levels enhance the incentives for sex-selection for immigrants while lower education 
levels enhance the incentives for sex-selection for the English. Furthermore, by using two 
independent datasets, we provide evidence that better educated Indian households whose first 
two children are male do have strong preferences for a balanced family. As expected, Indian 
households whose first two children are female do have stronger preferences for a son.  
We show the role of cultural norms in fuelling the sex-selection decision among Indian 
immigrants, illustrating this with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. We quantify the cultural 
differences between English and Indian families and show that they are instrumental in 
explaining the divergence in their average probabilities of male births. We attempt to quantify 
missing women in the UK among Indian immigrants during the period 1993-2006, using a 
methodology hitherto not employed in the literature and find that approximately 914 women 
might be missing. Since we take into account the balanced family preferences of better educated 
Indian households whose first two children are male, we avoid overestimating the predicted 
number of missing women.  
In terms of the policy implications of our findings, a developed country like the UK can invest 
either through the formal education system or in traditional media channels in order to minimize 
the number of missing women. However, this is costly, especially during a global economic 
crisis. Our results suggest that the government can possibly focus on the subgroup of Indian 
university-educated households with two daughters. This would lower the cost to government 
and lower the number of missing women. The government may also consider imposing taxes on 
sex-selection techniques. Perhaps future research should focus on investigating this question 
when data on prices of sex-selection techniques become available to researchers.  
In the meantime, our study of the UK contributes to existing research on other developed 
countries such as the US and Canada that missing women are not merely a phenomenon of the 
developing world. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Children’s Gender by Ethnicity  
Ethnicity 
First Child: 
Male 
Dummy 
Second 
Child: Male 
Dummy 
Third Child: 
Male 
Dummy 
Third Child: 
Male / First 
Two 
Children 
Female 
Third Child: 
Male / One 
Child Male 
and One 
Female 
English 
 
0.517 
99691 
0.510 
76351 
0.511 
30660 
0.504 
7549 
0.516 
14258 
Indian 
 
0.489 
1400 
0.475 
1131 
0.530 
598 
0.488 
205 
0.559 
272 
Pakistani 
 
0.541 
614 
0.475 
549 
0.507 
432 
0.504 
115 
0.508 
199 
English-Indian 
 
0.517 
503 
0.524 
382 
0.525 
158 
0.692 
39 
0.522 
67 
English- 
Pakistani 
0.533 
184 
0.460 
139 
0.482 
83 
0.571 
21 
0.455 
44 
Indian- 
Pakistani 
0.474 
38 
0.594 
32 
0.478 
23 
0.667 
3 
0.333 
15 
All 
 
0.517 
102430 
0.510 
78584 
0.512 
31957 
0.505 
7932 
0.516 
14855 
    Source:  The means are calculated from data in the UK General Household Survey 
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Table 2: Distribution of Children by Ethnicity 
Number of 
Children 
English Indian Pakistani 
English-
Indian 
English-
Pakistani 
Indian-
Pakistani 
Total 
1 23340 269 65 121 45 6 23846 
2 45688 533 117 224 56 9 46627 
3 20187 291 127 101 39 7 20752 
4 6914 165 111 34 27 8 7259 
5 2220 86 73 10 9 6 2404 
6+ 1342 56 121 13 8 2 1542 
Total 99691 1400 614 503 184 38 102430 
Source:  The numbers are calculated from data in the UK General Household Survey. 
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Table 3: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
 Dependent Variables 
Boy Indicator variable: Child born at a given parity is male  
Familysize Proxy for desired family size: Number of children born per household 
 Previous Children and Ethnicity Variables 
Allgirls Indicator variable: All previous children are girls 
Gendermix Indicator variable: Previous children are a mix of boys and girls  
Indian Ethnicity dummy: Household is Indian (0,1): At least one parent born in India 
Pakistani Ethnicity dummy: Household is Pakistani (0,1): At least one parent born in Pakistan 
English Ethnicity dummy: Household is English (0,1): At least one parent born in the UK 
 Individual and Household Variables 
University Dummy variable: A household is educated at the university level (0,1): At least one parent 
has first degree, higher degree or higher education qualifications 
Secondary Dummy variable: A household is educated at the secondary education level (0,1): At least 
one parent has achieved at least one of GCSE, O-level or A-Level qualifications 
Neverschool Dummy variable: A household never went to school (0,1): At least one parent never 
attended primary school  
Employed Dummy variable: A household is employed (0,1): At least one parent is employed  
Wealthy Dummy variable: A household is wealthy (0,1): Household owns a house  
London Region dummy that household resides in London (0,1) 
West Midlands Region dummy that household resides in the West Midlands (0,1) 
EastMidlands Region dummy that household resides in the East Midlands (0,1) 
North Region dummy that household resides in the North (0,1) 
Note: Most of the immigrants in our dataset live in the four regions listed above. All the other regions are 
included in the omitted variable category.   
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Table 4a: Estimation results from Logit and Poisson Regression Models 
Dataset Used: UK General Household Survey India NFHS 
Dependent variable:  
Third Child:  
Boy (1) 
Second Child:Boy  
(2) 
Family Size  
(3) 
Third Child: 
 Boy  (4) 
University -0.021** 
(0.0087) 
-0.012***  
(0.0036) 
-0.134***  
(0.0014) 
 
 
Secondary 0.017*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0054 
 (0.0034) 
-0.244*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
Never-schooled -0.059* 
(0.035) 
0.024 
 (0.016) 
-0.0048 
(0.018) 
 
 
Employed 0.0040 
(0.013) 
-0.0031  
(0.0042) 
-0.168*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
Wealthy 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.0026 
(0.0025) 
-0.172*** 
(0.013) 
  
 
Constant -0.051 
(0.091) 
-0.185** 
(0.081) 
  
 
Mixed Gender Interactions 
 
 
  
University 0.031 
(0.020)     
Secondary -0.016*** 
(0.0059)     
Never-schooled 0.072** 
 (0.036)     
Employed 0.0058 
 (0.019)     
Wealthy 
0.015 
 (0.027)    
 
 
Constant 0.0028 
(0.0060)     
All Girls Interactions 
    
 
University 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
-0.0018 
 (0.0038)   
 -0.012* 
(0.0069) 
0.083** 
 (0.036) 
0.0084 
 (0.013) 
0.010** 
 (0.0048) 
-0.033 
 (0.035) 
-0.0013 
 (0.0061) 
  
Secondary 
 
Never-schooled 
 
Employed 
 
Wealthy 
 
0.032 
 (0.028) 
0.0017 
(0.0084) 
  
Constant 
 
-0.032*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
  
Number of observations 31950 78555 102430 40316 
Likelihood ratio test: null 
hypothesis: No overdispersion
 
  
0.4 
 
Notes: Tables 4a, 4b and 4c are one table but we separate the results into three tables. For columns one and two, we estimate 
the Logit model using the General Household Survey dataset. In column three, we estimate the Poisson Regression Model using 
the same dataset. In column four, we examine the preferences of Indian households that live in India using the Logit model and 
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information obtained from the NFHS dataset. Regional and time dummy variables are included but not reported for brevity. 
Marginal effects are reported for all models (and standard errors associated with the marginal effects). Ethnicity-Region-
clustered (for columns 1-3), heteroskedastic -robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
Table 4b: Estimation results: Coefficients of Indian Interactions with the Independent Variables 
Dataset Used: UK General Household Survey India NFHS 
Dependent variable:  
Third Child: Boy  
(1) 
Second Child:Boy  
(2) 
Family Size  
(3) 
Third Child: 
 Boy  (4) 
University -0.234** 
(0.109) 
0.019  
(0.046) 
-0.486*** 
(0.113) 
-0.091* 
(0.044)  
Secondary -0.095 
(0.094) 
0.062** 
 (0.027) 
0.011 
(0.035) 
-0.0076 
(0.017)  
Never-schooled 0.288** 
(0.137) 
0.028 
 (0.046) 
0.349*** 
(0.121) 
-0.0042 
(0.014)  
Employed -0.065 
(0.116) 
0.019  
(0.037) 
-0.070 
(0.090)   
Wealthy 
0.122 
(0.098) 
0.065* 
(0.038) 
0.500*** 
(0.078) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
 
 
Constant -0.071 
(0.068) 
-0.076** 
(0.034) 
-0.040 
(0.128) 
0.012 
(0.014)  
Mixed Gender Interactions 
 
 
  
University 0.214 
(0.148)  
 
0.119** 
(0.052)  
Secondary 0.062 
(0.136)  
 
0.021 
(0.020)  
Never-schooled -0.327** 
 (0.160)  
 
0.013 
(0.018)  
Employed 0.046 
 (0.155)  
 
  
Wealthy 
-0.027 
 (0.142)  
 
-0.0086  
(0.014) 
 
 
Constant 0.013 
(0.098)  
 
0.0019 
(0.017)  
All Girls Interactions 
    
University 
0.440*** 
(0.112) 
0.032  
(0.078) 
 
0.223*** 
(0.054) 
 
 0.178 
(0.178) 
-0.124 
 (0.213) 
0.052 
 (0.091) 
-0.086 
 (0.062) 
-0.0091 
 (0.066) 
-0.031  
(0.051) 
 
0.037* 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
 
 
 
Secondary 
 
Never-schooled 
 
Employed 
 
Wealthy 
 
-0.261* 
 (0.151) 
-0.035 
(0.071) 
 
0.023 
(0.016) 
Constant 
 
0.203** 
(0.103) 
0.031 
(0.060) 
 
0.0059 
(0.018) 
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Notes: The coefficients for columns 1-3 should be interpreted as the difference in the probability of a male birth at a given 
parity between an Indian and an English household, conditional on all previous births. It is important to note that for column 4 
the coefficients represent directly the preferences and not the difference from other ethnic groups. Regional and time dummy 
variables are included but not reported for brevity. Marginal effects are reported for all models (and standard errors associated 
with the marginal effects). Ethnicity-Region-clustered (for columns 1-3), heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 4c: Estimation Results: Coefficients of Pakistani Interactions with Independent Variables 
Dataset Used: UK General Household Survey India NFHS 
Dependent variable:  
Third Child: Boy 
(1) 
Second Child:Boy  
(2) 
Family Size  
(3) 
Third Child: 
 Boy  (4) 
University 0.310** 
(0.091) 
-0.034  
(0.044) 
-0.041 
(0.106) 
  
 
Secondary 0.210*** 
(0.069) 
0.032 
 (0.091) 
-0.190*** 
(0.067) 
 
 
Never-schooled 0.199** 
(0.088) 
-0.039 
 (0.071) 
0.474*** 
(0.082) 
 
 
Employed -0.071 
(0.089) 
-0.123***  
(0.043) 
 -0.039 
(0.078) 
 
 
Wealthy 
0.046 
(0.060) 
-0.047 
(0.060) 
0.420*** 
(0.056) 
  
 
Constant -0.141 
(0.092) 
0.113** 
(0.052) 
0.476*** 
(0.135) 
 
 
Mixed Gender Interactions 
 
 
  
University -0.435*** 
(0.119)     
Secondary -0.156 
(0.129)     
Never-schooled -0.300*** 
 (0.102)     
Employed 0.064 
 (0.060)     
Wealthy 
0.032  
 (0.093)    
 
 
Constant  0.046 
(0.073)     
All Girls Interactions 
    
 
University 
-0.480*** 
(0.158) 
0.088  
(0.101)   
 -0.143 
(0.107) 
-0.219** 
 (0.108) 
-0.028 
 (0.096) 
0.035 
 (0.110) 
0.084 
 (0.081) 
0.133  
(0.097) 
  
Secondary 
 
Never-schooled 
 
Employed 
 
Wealthy 
 
0.129 
 (0.083) 
0.030 
(0.103) 
  
26 
 
Constant 
 
-0.047 
(0.162) 
-0.179 
(0.113) 
  
Notes: The coefficients for columns 1-3 should be interpreted as the difference in the probability of a male birth at a given 
parity between a Pakistani and an English household, conditional on all previous births. Regional and time dummy variables are 
included but not reported for brevity. Marginal effects are reported for all models (and standard errors associated with the 
marginal effects). Ethnicity-Region-clustered (for columns 1-3), heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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 Table 5: Estimating the number of Indian 'missing women' 
 Panels:         Indian families: Panel (A) English families: Panel (B) 
Periods:        1970-2006  1993-2006 1970-2006 1993-2006 
Gender: Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Actual: 400 356 192 176 15758 15060 6579 6319 
Predicted: 388 368 186 182 14908 15910 7330 5568 
% Changed: -3.00 3.37 -3.13 3.41 -5.39 5.64 11.42 -11.88 
Notes: The prediction percentages for the subsample (1993-2006) and their associated standard errors for Panel A and Panel B 
are: 50.60638 (0.57334) and 56.82986 (2.22453) respectively. The associated 95% confidence intervals for the boys of the 
subsample for Panel A and Panel B are: [182, 190] and [6768, 7892] respectively. 
 
